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ABSTRACT: This study aims to measure the effect of Marmara earthquake on the 
stock returns of the firms quoted in ISE and operating in financial sector by the use 
of conventional econometric methodology of event studies. The results indicate that 
the occurrence of the earthquake has produced negative and significant abnormal 
returns. For each of the insurance firms studied, largely significant abnormal returns 
are observed just after the earthquake. The response of banks is negative but the 
significance level is less important.  
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ÖZET: Bu çalışmanın amacı, “olay çalışması” yöntemi kullanmak suretiyle, 
İMKB’de işlem görmekte olan finansal sektör hisselerinin getirileri üzerinde, büyük 
Marmara depreminin yarattığı etkiyi ölçebilmektir. Sonuçlar, depremin bu hisseler 
üzerinde kayda değer büyüklükte negatif bir “artık getiri” oluşturduğuna işaret 
etmektedir. İnceleme kapsamındaki tüm sigorta sektörü hisselerinde yüksek 
anlamlılık düzeyinde negatif “artık getiriler” gözlenmiştir. Bankacılık sektörü 
hisselerinde de negatif “artık getiriler” gözlenmiş olmakla birlikte, anlamlılık 
düzeyleri daha düşük bulunmuştur. 
 
Keywords: Deprem ; Olay çalışması ; Sigorta şirketleri ; Bankalar ; Türkiye 
 
1. Introduction 
Catastrophic events, like earthquakes, may create huge losses for the “exposed” 
firms not only in the real sector but also in the financial sector. The aim of this study 
is to examine the effect of 17 August 1999’s earthquake, which was a devastating 
event occurred in the north-west region of Turkey, on the stock returns of the firms 
quoted in ISE and operating in financial sector. More specifically, the sample 
includes the firms operating in the banking sector and in the insurance sector. We 
can expect two opposing results about the impact of the earthquake on the value of 
the insurance firms. As it is stated by Shelor et al. (1992), on one hand, the rapid 
depletion of surplus accounts fostered by catastrophic events may cause investors to 
discount insurance firm stock value. On the other hand, insurers may benefit from a 
catastrophic event because of subsequent increased consumer or institutional 
demand. About the impact of the earthquake on the stock prices of the firms 
operating in the banking sector, it is expected that it will be negative. The reason 
behind this supposition is as follows: The demand for cash will increase, which in 
turn will deplete the depository accounts of the banks. 
 
This study examines only short-term impact in a 30-day event window by 
employing event study methodology. The general applicability of the event study 
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methodology has led to its wide use. In the fields of accounting and finance, event 
study methodology has been applied to various firm-specific and economy-wide 
events including mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, etc. 
Applications of event study methodology on the fields other than finance and 
accounting are also abundant. Among these fields, we can cite law and economics 
(Campbell et al., 1997). 
 
The first part of this paper reviews previous literature about the impact of 
catastrophic events on stock market performance. Then, data and methodology used 
in the study are explained. Finally, empirical findings and conclusions are presented. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In capital markets, investors have access to several information about quoted firms, 
which generate expectations concerning risk and earnings. In efficient markets, 
stock prices should reflect quickly all of the relevant information about the firms. 
There may be many different information about the firms such as dividend and 
earnings announcements, mergers and acquisitions, etc. The impact of these types of 
information on common stock returns has been the subject of numerous articles 
(Ahanory and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Charest, 1978; Odabaşı, 
1998). On the other hand, the number of studies examining the effect of catastrophic 
events on stock returns is relatively limited. The catastrophic events, which have 
been so far utilized in the analyses are hurricanes, earthquakes, nuclear accidents 
and terrorist attacks.  
 
The study of Hill and Schneeweis (1983) examines the effect on the stock returns of 
public utility firms of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear accident. The sample 
used in this study is composed of 30 non-nuclear and 34 nuclear utilities selected 
from the electric utilities whose common stock are traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange for the period examined. The findings validate that, in the month of TMI, 
both the nuclear and non-nuclear firms experienced negative abnormal returns. The 
results indicate also that the negative returns were larger for firms using nuclear 
power. Another study, similar to that of Hill and Schneeweis (1983), is carried out 
by Fields and Janjigian (1989). This paper examines the reaction of U.S. public 
utilities’ stock prices to the Chernobyl nuclear power accident. Similar to the results 
of previous studies on TMI, the results of Fields and Janjigian’s (1989) study 
indicate that investors who held public utility stocks earned significant negative 
abnormal returns during the three day trading period following the announcement of 
the Chernobyl accident. Moreover, the losses of firms utilizing nuclear power were 
greater than those of the non-nuclear firms.  
 
Another type of unanticipated catastrophic events considered by the researchers for 
evaluating its impact on stock prices is “fatal commercial airline crashes”. The 
results of the analysis of Barrett et al. (1987) indicate that the immediate negative 
reaction to fatal airline crashes is significant for only one full trading day after the 
event occurs.  
 
Nevertheless, the catastrophic events, the most widely considered by the researchers 
for evaluating their impact on stock prices, are the earthquakes and the hurricanes. 
For instance, Shelor et al. (1990) examine the impact of the October 17, 1989 
California earthquake on the stock value of firms in the real estate industry. The 
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findings of this study indicate that the earthquake bring important new information 
to the market since there is a statistically significant negative stock returns among 
the firms operating in the San Francisco area. On the other hand, real estate-related 
firms operating in other areas of California are unaffected by the earthquake. Two 
years later, in 1992, the same authors, Shelor et al. examine the impact of the 
October 17, 1989 California earthquake on the stock value of firms in the property-
liability insurance sector. They claim, initially, two opposing hypotheses: (1) 
Insurers benefit from a catastrophic event because of subsequent increased demand 
(gaining from loss hypothesis); or, (2) The rapid reduction of surplus accounts 
fostered by catastrophic events causes investors to discount insurance firm stock 
values. The results of the study support the first hypothesis since the property-
liability insurer stock values increased after the earthquake. In the same way, 
Yamori and Kobayashi (1999) examine the impact of the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake on Japanese insurers’ value. The main finding of this study, which can 
be considered as the first attempt to empirically investigate a non-U.S. stock market 
reaction to a large earthquake, is the significant negative stock price reaction, which 
is in contradiction with the results for U.S. earthquakes. 
 
Hurricanes, also, became the subject of numerous event studies aiming to evaluate 
their impact on stock values. For instance, Lamb (1995) analyzes the impact of 
Hurricane Andrew on the property-liability insurer stock values. This study 
categorizes the firms in the property-liability industry in terms of loss exposure and 
no loss exposure in order to determine if the market discriminated among insurers 
based on this risk. The results show that Hurricane Andrew produced a significant 
negative stock price reaction on property-liability insurers with direct premiums 
written in Florida or Louisiana. On the other hand, unexposed firms’ response to 
Hurricane Andrew was not significant. In other words, the results validate the 
hypothesis that the market efficiently interpreted the information generated by the 
hurricane and discriminated among property-liability insurers based on the existence 
and magnitude of insurance written. Lamb (1998) examined also the effects that 
Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew had on the stock returns of the property and casualty 
firms. There were 34 firms in the sample (17 exposed firms, 17 unexposed firms). 
The results indicate that Hurricane Hugo and Hurricane Andrew produced different 
market reactions on property and casualty firms. While the firms were unaffected by 
Hurricane Hugo, Hurricane Andrew generated a significant negative impact only on 
firms with premium business in Florida or Louisiana. 
 
A relatively recent study is carried out by Carter and Simkins (2004) in order to 
investigate the stock-price reaction of airlines to the September 11th attacks. The 
findings indicate that there are significant negative abnormal returns for each of the 
airlines studied and smaller negative returns for airfreight firms. In other words, the 
market reaction was not the same for all airlines. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The sample is selected from those firms involved in the Turkish financial sector 
(banking and insurance) that were publicly traded in 1999. There are 20 firms in the 
sample, in total. Data files provided by Istanbul Stock Exchange are used for 
obtaining the daily stock returns. The unadjusted stock returns are, firstly, adjusted 
through the capital increases and dividend distributions. 
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In this study, the econometric methodology of event studies suggested by 
MacKinlay (1997) is employed. Thus far, the event study methodology has been 
applied to a variety of firm-specific and economy wide events such as mergers and 
acquisitions, earnings announcements, issues of new debt or equity, etc. (Campbell 
et al, 1997: 149). In this study, the event in question, 17 August 1999’s earthquake, 
is different than firm-specific events. The event window is 30 trading days following 
the event (26.08.1999 – 07.10.1999)1. Pre-event days are not included in the event 
period since the event being considered is unexpected in nature. In order to calculate 
the normal return of the selected securities (prior to the calculation of abnormal 
returns), the market model is employed. This model assumes a stable linear relation 
between the market return and the security return. For any security i the market 
model is: 
 
 Rit = αi + βiRmt+εit (1) 
 E[εit]=0 var[εit] = σεi2 
 
where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio2, 
respectively, and εit is the zero mean disturbance term. αi, βi, and σεi2 are the 
parameters of the market model. 
 
The parameters of the model are estimated by using an estimation window covering 
250 days prior to the event. In other words, the expected daily return for each 
security is computed by observing the market behavior over a 250 trading days 
interval. Return observations begin 250 trading days before the earthquake and 
continue until the day before the earthquake (t= -250 to -1). The event period is not 
included in the estimation period to prevent the event from influencing the normal 
performance model parameter estimates. 
 
The estimation procedure for the market model parameters includes ordinary least 
squares (OLS). For the ith firm in event time, the OLS estimators of the market 
model parameters for an estimation window of observations are: 
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1 As the ISE was closed during 7 trading days due to the earthquake, the 26.08.1999 is considered as the 
first day of the event window, namely as the event date. In other words, we define t=0 as the event date. 
t=T1 (t=0) to t=T2 (t=29) represents the event window, and t=T0 (t=-250) to t=T1-1 (t=-1) constitutes the 
estimation window. L1=T0 to T1 and L2=T1 to T2 are the length of the estimation window and the event 
window respectively. 
2Market portfolio is represented by ISE-100 index.  
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Rit and Rmt are the return in event period t for security i and the market respectively. 
 
Then, the measurement and analysis of abnormal returns are considered. The 
abnormal return can be interpreted as a measure of the impact of the event on the 
value of the firm over the event window. The abnormal return is the difference 
between observed and predicted returns and the cumulative abnormal return is the 
cumulative sum of the average abnormal returns. The sign, magnitude, and statistical 
significance of the abnormal returns indicate whether there is a market response to 
earthquake-related information. 
 
For firm i and event date t the abnormal return is: 
 
 ARit = Rit - E(Rit⏐Xt) (4) 
 
where ARit, Rit and E(Rit⏐Xt) are the abnormal, actual and normal returns 
respectively for time period t. Xt is the conditioning information for the normal 
return model. Or, more precisely, in case of using market model to measure the 
normal return, the sample abnormal return is: 
 
 mtiiitit RRAR
∧∧ −−= βα  (5) 
 
After the calculation of abnormal returns, the testing framework for the abnormal 
returns has to be designed: (1) definition of the null hypothesis; (2) determination of 
the techniques for aggregating the individual firm abnormal returns. The formulation 
of the econometric design is followed by the presentation of the empirical results. 
 
Under the null hypothesis, that the event (earthquake, in our case) has no impact on 
the behavior of returns (mean or variance) the distributional properties of the 
abnormal returns can be used to draw inferences over any period within the event 
window. Under H0 the distribution of the sample abnormal return of a given 
observation in the event window is: 
 
 ARit ∼ N(0,σ2(ARit)) (6) 
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The next step involves the aggregation of abnormal return observations in order to 
draw overall inferences for the event of interest. The aggregation is carried out 
through time and across securities. After the aggregation through time for an 
individual security, the aggregation both across securities and through time is 
considered. We define CARi (t1, t2) as the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from t1 
to t2 where T1≤ t1≤ t2≤T2. The CAR from t1 to t2 is the sum of the included abnormal 
returns, 
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The distribution of the cumulative abnormal return under H0 is: 
 
 ( )( )21221 ,,0),( ttNttCAR ii σ≈  (9) 
 
where, 
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Based on the cumulative abnormal returns, we can test the null hypothesis. 
 
The next step involves the aggregation of the abnormal return observations for the 
event window and across observations of the event. In our case, since there is 
overlap in the event windows of the included securities, clustering is applied. For the 
application of the clustering approach, we constructed an equally-weighted portfolio 
from the securities constituting our sample4. Then, the procedure described above 
for the individual security analysis is repeated for this portfolio. The abnormal return 
of the portfolio (denoted as p) for date t is calculated as follows: 
 
 mtppptpt RRAR
∧∧ −−= βα  (11) 
 
In fact, due to the portfolio characteristics, this result is identical to the average of 
the abnormal returns of the securities: 
 
                                                 
3 The second component 
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in αi and βi approaches zero as the length of the estimation window becomes large. 
4 This portfolio construction process is repeated 3 times: firstly for the banks, then for the insurance 
firms, finally for the whole sample. 
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where N is the number of firms in the sample. 
 
 
The variance of the portfolio is calculated as follows: 
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and for large L1, the second component approaches to zero. 
 
 
The aggregation of the average abnormal returns over the event window is carried 
out by aggregating the portfolio’s abnormal returns.  
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The distribution of the cumulative abnormal return of the portfolio, under H0 is: 
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If the absolute value of θ is greater than 1.96, then the average abnormal return for 
that stock is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The empirical results will lead to insights relating to understanding the sources and 
causes of the effects (or lack of effects) of the event under study, more specifically, 
the 17 August 1999’s earthquake. Table 1 presents the average daily and cumulative 
abnormal returns for the banking firms, insurance firms and the whole sample for 
the event window (30 trading days following the event date). A significant negative 
price response after the event date would provide evidence that the earthquake 
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produced unfavorable information that was manifested in depressed stock prices. On 
the other hand, a significant positive reaction would be interpreted as favorable 
information and no significant reaction would denote that the earthquake did not 
produce any new or important information that influenced stock prices.  
 
Table 1. Market Response Measures for Banking Firms, Insurance Firms and 
All of Them 
Event 
Date 
Banks 
(n=15) 
Insurance Firms  
(n=5) 
Banks + Insurance Firms 
(n=20) 
ARp CARp θ value ARp CARp θ value  ARp CARp θ value 
0 -0.0310 -0.0310  -2.468** -0.1154 -0.1154 -5.605*** -0.0521 -0.0521 -4.344*** 
1  0.0055 -0.0255  -1.436  0.0029 -0.1125 -3.865***  0.0048 -0.0473 -2.787*** 
2  0.0181 -0.0074  -0.340 -0.0037 -0.1163 -3.260***  0.0127 -0.0346  -1.666* 
3 -0.0005 -0.0079  -0.314  0.0270 -0.0892  -2.167**  0.0064 -0.0282  -1.176 
4  0.0079  0.0000  0.002  0.0117 -0.0776  -1.684*  0.0089 -0.0194  -0.721 
5  0.0105  0.0106  0.344 -0.0087 -0.0862  -1.710*  0.0057 -0.0136  -0.463 
6 -0.0193 -0.0087  -0.261 -0.0127 -0.0990  -1.817* -0.0176 -0.0313  -0.985 
7 -0.0103 -0.0190  -0.534  0.0021 -0.0969  -1.664* -0.0072 -0.0385  -1.134 
8 -0.0064 -0.0254  -0.674  0.0273 -0.0696  -1.127  0.0020 -0.0365  -1.013 
9 -0.0072 -0.0326  -0.821 -0.0135 -0.0831  -1.276 -0.0088 -0.0452  -1.192 
10 -0.0088 -0.0414  -0.992 -0.0407 -0.1238  -1.813* -0.0167 -0.0620  -1.558 
11 -0.0031 -0.0445  -1.022  0.0245 -0.0993  -1.393  0.0038 -0.0582  -1.401 
12  0.0143 -0.0302  -0.667 -0.0033 -0.1027  -1.383  0.0099 -0.0483  -1.117 
13  0.0103 -0.0200  -0.424 -0.0229 -0.1256  -1.630  0.0020 -0.0464  -1.033 
14  0.0000 -0.0199  -0.409  0.0085 -0.1171  -1.469  0.0022 -0.0442  -0.952 
15 -0.0014 -0.0213  -0.424  0.0172 -0.0999  -1.213  0.0032 -0.0410  -0.854 
16 -0.0064 -0.0278  -0.536  0.0256 -0.0743  -0.875  0.0016 -0.0394  -0.797 
17  0.0027 -0.0250  -0.470 -0.0116 -0.0859  -0.984 -0.0009 -0.0403  -0.791 
18  0.0013 -0.0237  -0.433  0.0133 -0.0726  -0.809  0.0043 -0.0359  -0.687 
19  0.0017 -0.0220  -0.392 -0.0137 -0.0863  -0.937 -0.0021 -0.0381  -0.710 
20 -0.0029 -0.0249  -0.432  0.0144 -0.0719  -0.762  0.0015 -0.0366  -0.666 
21  0.0010 -0.0239  -0.406 -0.0004 -0.0723  -0.749  0.0006 -0.0360  -0.640 
22  0.0042 -0.0197  -0.327 -0.0002 -0.0725  -0.735  0.0031 -0.0329  -0.572 
23  0.0031 -0.0165  -0.269 -0.0021 -0.0746  -0.740  0.0018 -0.0311  -0.529 
24  0.0123 -0.0042  -0.067  0.0049 -0.0697  -0.677  0.0105 -0.0206  -0.343 
25  0.0080  0.0037  0.058  0.0134 -0.0564  -0.537  0.0093 -0.0113  -0.184 
26  0.0142  0.0179  0.275  0.0275 -0.0288  -0.269  0.0175  0.0062  0.100 
27  0.0002  0.0182  0.273  0.0118 -0.0170  -0.156  0.0031  0.0094  0.148 
28 -0.0059  0.0123  0.181  0.0159 -0.0011  -0.010 -0.0005  0.0089  0.138 
29  0.0156  0.0278  0.404  0.0236 0.0225  0.199  0.0176  0.0265  0.403 
(*): significant at the 0.1 level 
(**):significant at the 0.05 level 
(***):significant at the 0.01 level 
t-values are calculated for CARs 
 
This study provides evidence that the 17 August 1999’s earthquake had significantly 
negative impact not only on banking firms’ but also on insurance firms’ returns. 
This significant negative impact on stock returns is valid for the whole sample. The 
detailed examination of the results presented in Table 1 shows that while the 
significant negative response of insurance firms, in terms of CARs, continues during 
eight days, the significant negative response of banking firms to the earthquake keep 
on one trading day. 
 
In the sample of banking firms, the most significant negative reaction to the 
earthquake belongs to Demirbank and Yaşarbank (abnormal returns are –0,0701 and 
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–0,0609 respectively). On the other hand, in the sample of insurance firms, a very 
significant negative response in the first trading day is valid for all of the firms.  
 
Figure 1 presents a comparison of the cumulative abnormal returns through the fifty 
days after the earthquake date for banking firms, insurance firms and the whole 
sample.  
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
The trend of cumulative abnormal returns during fifty days following the earthquake 
date is quite interesting. Until twenty-ninth day, although both of the banking and 
insurance firms reacted negatively to the earthquake, the extent of the reaction is 
greater for the insurance firms. At the twenty-ninth day, the levels of CARs become 
equal for both of the sectors. Then the trend changes and the CARs turn out to be 
positive. Moreover, the size of the positive response is greater for the insurance 
firms compared to the banking firms. We can presume that the first response of 
insurance firms supports the following hypothesis of Shelor et al (1992): The rapid 
depletion of surplus accounts fostered by catastrophic events may cause investors to 
discount insurance firm stock value. On the other hand, the positive trend of CARs, 
which begins thirty days after the earthquake supports the hypothesis that insurers 
may benefit from a catastrophic event because of subsequent increased consumer or 
institutional demand. 
 
It is worth to note that, in studies with a limited number of event observations, the 
empirical results can be heavily influenced by one or two firms. Knowledge of this 
is important for gauging the importance of the results. 
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5. Conclusion 
The 17 August 1999’s earthquake, which had great impact especially on Gölcük, 
Adapazarı, İzmit, caused serious difficulties for many firms including financial 
institutions. On 26 August 1999, the first trading day after the earthquake, the stock 
market (ISE 100 index) had fallen down by -0.1038. In this paper, we have studied 
only the short-term reaction of financial institutions to the 17 August 1999’s 
earthquake and ignore potential longer-term effects on cash flows or risk premium 
effects. We have used the event study methodology in the empirical analysis. We 
find largely significant abnormal returns, just after the earthquake, for each of the 
insurance firms studied. The response of banks is negative but the significance level 
less important. 
 
Overall, our results are important since they support psychological impact of the 17 
August 1999’s earthquake in ISE. In terms of implications concerning the market 
efficiency, it is difficult to presume that ISE is efficient. Based on the results, we can 
state that, firstly, financial institutions’ stock prices reacted negatively to the 
“earthquake” but then, in one month, a recovery in the market prices is 
reestablished, by a considerable increase. The results highlight the fact that 
earthquake-induced disruptions pose risks that require management attention. This 
can be considered as a crucial information for the firms operating in Turkey and 
particularly in Istanbul, which is an earthquake prone region. 
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